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1. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Aviall Services, Inc.,1 which limits Potentially Responsible Parties' (PRPs)2
ability to obtain contribution from other PRPs, undermines the United States
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) goal of encouraging the use of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to reach negotiated settlements.3 The
* J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, 2007. I would
like to thank my wife, Shana, for her support through all of the ups and downs of law
school and for her continuing support into the future. Also, I would like to thank
Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole for allowing me to work with her and learn the elements of
writing a journal article. Finally, thank you to all members of the Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution for working so hard to ensure the continued success of the journal,
especially the Managing Editor who worked on this Note and all of the staff members.
I Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
2 "Potentially Responsible Party or PRP means any person who may be liable
pursuant to § 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), for response costs incurred and to
be incurred by the United States not inconsistent with [the National Contingency Plan
NCP)]." 40 C.F.R. § 304.12(m) (2002). The National Contingency Plan provides
procedures for CERCLA site investigation, evaluation, remediation, and documentation.
Stanley A. Millan, Contemporary CERCLA: Reversals of Fortune and Black Holes, 16
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 183, 185 (2005). "The [National Contingency Plan] applies to
both private clean-ups as well as the EPA clean-ups." Id.
3 See Alternative Dispute Resolution at EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/adr/cprcadratepa.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2007). The website
states:
[The] EPA encourages the use of ADR techniques to prevent and resolve
disputes with external parties (e.g., state agencies, industry, environmental advocacy
groups) in many contexts, including adjudications, rulemaking, policy development,
administrative and civil judicial enforcement actions, permit issuance, protests of
contract awards, administration of contracts and grants, stakeholder involvement,
negotiations, and litigation.
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use of ADR and negotiated settlements by the EPA is essential for resolving
conflicts involving the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 4
The EPA and the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ)5 continue to
"strongly support" the use of ADR and negotiated settlements in order to
resolve conflicts under CERCLA. 6 The EPA policy on ADR points to the
numerous benefits of ADR, including faster resolution of issues; more
creative, satisfying, and enduring solutions; reduced transaction costs;
fostering a culture of respect and trust among the EPA, its stakeholders, and
its employees; improved working relationships; increased likelihood of
compliance with environmental laws and regulations; broader stakeholder
support for agency programs; and better environmental outcomes.7 In fact, a
recent joint statement by the CEQ and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) stated that agencies adopting Environmental Conflict Resolution
(ECR) and ADR mechanisms and strategies "have reported progress on
Id.
4 See Jon Niermann, Alternative Dispute Resolution in CERCLA Settlement, 17 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 389, 389 (2002) (stating that "[ADR] is an indispensable, if
imperfect, component of the federal government's efforts to address the threats posed to
human health and the environment by the nation's hazardous waste sites"); see also Mary
C. Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part II): Asserting a Sovereign
Servitude to Protect Habitat ofImperiled Species, 25 VT. L. REV. 355, 425 n.339 (2001).
"The use of [ADR] is gaining ground in resolving environmental conflicts and has
spawned a distinct field of Environmental Conflict Resolution (ECR)." Id.
5 A recent joint memorandum from the Center of Environmental Quality and the
Office of Management and Budget reinforced the Executive's commitment to
Environmental Conflict Resolution and ADR. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET AND
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL
CONFLICT RESOLUTION [hereinafter MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION] (2005), http://www.ecr.gov/pdf/OMBCEQ_JointStatement.pdf. Through
the use of ADR, federal agencies handling environmental conflicts are able to improve
negotiated outcomes and the implementation of agreements. Id. Additionally, "ADR
helps make the government more results-oriented, citizen-centered and provides for
effective public participation in government decisions, encourages respect for affected
parties and nurtures good relationships for the future." Id.
6 See id.; Environmental Protection Agency Policy on Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,858 (Dec. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.epa.gov/adr/epaadrpolicyfinal.pdf (stating that "[t]he [EPA] strongly supports
the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to deal with disputes and potential
conflicts").
7 Id. at 81,858-59 (finding that ADR creates a more efficient workplace and
increases cooperation with State and local governments, PRPs, public interest groups, and
the public).
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improving negotiated outcomes and the implementation of agreements."8
The CEQ and OMB joint statement called for the creation of incentives to
increase the use of ADR and "[d]ocumenting other useful forms of ADR
such as un-assisted principled negotiation." 9
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall undermines
the EPA's policy of promoting the use of ADR and reaching negotiated
settlements between PRPs and the EPA or other PRPs. 10 PRPs may now only
obtain contribution under certain circumstances. A PRP may seek
contribution if it has been sued under § 106"1 or § 107(a) 12 of CERCLA, or if
8 MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 5. The
statement further directs agencies "to increase the effective use of [ECR] and build
institutional capacity for collaborative problem solving." Id. Some examples of
mechanisms and strategies include, but are not limited to, "[s]etting performance goals
for increasing use of ECR; explore why goals may not be met and what steps are
necessary to meet them in the future," "[t]racking annual costs of environmental conflict
to the agency and setting goals for reduction in such costs," "[i]dentifying annual
resource savings and benefits accrued from collaborative solutions," "[d]rawing on
agency dispute resolution specialist and existing agency ADR resources pursuant to the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998," "[b]uilding expert knowledge, skills, and
capacity by strengthening intellectual and technical expertise in ECR and [ADR],"
"supporting early assessment and assistance for ECR and [ADR] so that subsequent
savings can occur through improved outcomes and reduced administrative appeals and
litigation." Id.
9 1d.
10 See Perry A. Craft & Michael G. Sheppard, What the US. Supreme Court's 2004-
2005 Decisions Mean to Tennessee Lawyers, 41 TENN. B. J. 16, 18 (Sept. 2005) (stating
that Cooper v. Aviall will discourage PRPs from entering into settlements without
litigation, and that the PRP's counsel may demand the PRP to wait for litigation "to
preserve their rights to contribution").
I1 CERCLA § 106 involves the issuance of administrative orders by the President in
order to protect the public health and welfare. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2000).
12 CERCLA § 107(a) states:
(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate;
"comparable maturity" date Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner or operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
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the PRP has completely resolved its liability through either an
administratively or judicially approved settlement. 13 The Supreme Court's
decision in Cooper v. Aviall encourages PRPs to wait for litigation instead of
voluntarily incurring cleanup costs or negotiating settlements with
administrative agencies. 14
This Note will discuss the impact of Cooper v. Aviall on negotiated
settlements and a possible solution to the problems created by the Supreme
Court's decision. Part II discusses the role of ADR and negotiated
settlements under CERCLA. 15 Part IH analyzes the Supreme Court's
decision in Cooper v. Aviall.16 Part IV discusses the effects of Cooper v.
Aviall on the incentive for PRPs to negotiate settlements with the EPA or
state administrative agencies. 17 Part V discusses why Congress should amend
CERCLA to allow PRPs incurring voluntary cleanup costs to obtain
contribution from other PRPs and why the continued use of ADR under
CERCLA is essential. 18
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
13 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167.
14 See Millan, supra note 2, at 214. "One aftermath of [Cooper v. Aviall] is increased
litigation over the nature of any implied contribution actions under Section 9607 or other
causes of action under federal environmental laws (i.e. Resource Conservation Recovery
Act) or state mini-CERCLAs." Id.
15 See infra Part II.
16 See infra Part III; see also Millan, supra note 2, at 213-14.
17 See infra Part IV.
18 See infra Part V.
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II. NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS AND ADR UNDER CERCLA
ADR techniques have been critical for the EPA in settling conflicts
involving environmental liability.' 9 Using ADR to resolve conflicts over
environmental issues results in the opening of lines of communication
between the EPA and PRPs.20 Increasing the use of ADR in resolving
environmental issues may lead to more efficient and beneficial resolutions
for improving the public health and welfare.21 Section A of this Part will
describe the background of negotiated settlements under CERCLA. 22 Section
B will discuss some additional ADR techniques-outside of principle party
negotiation-used by the EPA to facilitate negotiated settlements between
PRPs and the EPA.23
19 See Niermann, supra note 4, at 390-91.
The [EPA] identified a particularly valuable role for ADR under
CERCLA. The EPA believed that it could more quickly accomplish
CERCLA's objective of cleaning up the nation's hazardous waste sites by
enlisting responsible parties to cooperate in the cleanup effort. This was
accomplished by seeking negotiated settlements with the [PRPs] instead of
employing the more traditional tools of reimbursement actions, court
orders, and administrative orders expressly provided in CERCLA.
Id.; see also Shana A. Samson, Notes & Comments, Using Alternative Dispute
Resolution to Streamline Superfund, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 519, 529 (2000)
(arguing that ADR can be extremely effective under CERCLA because PRPs are subject
to strict liability and generally have little incentive to litigate).
20 See Environmental Protection Agency Policy on Alternative Dispute Resolution,
65 Fed. Reg. 81,858-59.
21 See Niermann, supra note 4, at 413-14.
The ADR tools of CERCLA's settlement procedures are indispensable in
promoting timely and cost-effective settlement and remediation, especially in light
of the failure of litigation. For most cost-recovery and contribution actions, litigation
has proven to be a wholly inadequate approach. CERCLA litigation frequently
generates disproportionate transaction costs ... [and] [m]oreover, litigation tends to
delay response.
Id.
22 See infra Part II.A.
23 See infra Part II.B.
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A. Background of Negotiated Settlements Under CERCLA
Congress first enacted CERCLA in 1980.24 CERCLA's primary goal is
to remediate hazardous waste sites and to hold PRPs liable for remediation
costs.25 When Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 with the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), 26 it added provisions which
were meant to streamline settlements27 and allow PRPs to more easily obtain
contribution from other PRPs. 28 Congress used the amendments in SARA to
strongly encourage the use of negotiated settlements under CERCLA.29
Because CERCLA is a strict liability regime, many PRPs choose to bypass
the litigation process, admit responsibility, and voluntarily enter into
negotiations culminating in a consent decree with the EPA.30 When PRPs
voluntarily choose to enter into settlement negotiations, it may drastically
decrease litigation costs and increase efficiency in resolving disputes over
environmentally impacted sites.31 The provisions of § 122 also provide
incentives for PRPs to negotiate a settlement.32 The most important incentive
24 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). The cited statute is commonly referred to as CERCLA or
as Superfund.
25 See Niermann, supra note 4, at 394.
26 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (2000); see also Samson, supra note 19, at 521 (stating that
"CERCLA was amended by [SARA] in 1986 to provide a variety of improvements,
including the encouragement of negotiated settlement. CERCLA, as amended by SARA,
includes many opportunities for ADR to expedite settlement while reducing transaction
costs.").
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000).
29 See Samson, supra note 19, at 521.
30 See 6 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 15.03 (Matthew
Bender & Company, Inc. 2004); see also Kenneth K. Kilbert, Successor Liability Under
CERCLA: Whither Substantial Continuity, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005). PRPs
will be held strictly liable, regardless of fault, for the "costs incurred in response to
releases of hazardous substances" under CERCLA. Kilbert, supra, at 3.
31 See Samson, supra note 19, at 521 (establishing that "CERCLA, as amended by
SARA, includes many opportunities for ADR to expedite settlement while reducing
transaction costs").
32 Niermann, supra note 4, at 397. These incentives include a covenant not to sue
and control over site investigation and remediation. Id.
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for the PRP is the covenant not to sue, which prevents the PRP from being
held additionally liable at the specific environmentally impacted site.33
When the EPA begins an enforcement action under CERCLA, its goal is
to reach a voluntary settlement with each PRP.34 The EPA issues a PRP letter
to suspected PRPs informing them of potential liability for the cleanup of an
environmentally impacted property.35 The letter also calls for the PRP to
enter into informal negotiations. 36 The PRP is then faced with three choices:
(1) enter into negotiations to reach a voluntary settlement; (2) force the
government to order cleanup; or (3) have the government clean up the site
and face litigation for reimbursement costs. 37
In the past, entering into voluntary negotiated settlements was an
effective approach for PRPs in CERCLA's strict liability regime. 38
Voluntarily entering into settlement negotiations provides numerous
advantages to PRPs.39 First, PRPs may obtain immunity from contribution
33 Id. The covenant not to sue "protect[s] settling parties from government actions
for additional relief, and contribution protection, which protect settling parties from
contribution actions by other PRPs." Id; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 9622(f), (g)(2) (2000); 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 9622(h)(4) (2000).
34 Superfund Program; Notice Letters, Negotiations and Information Exchange, 53
Fed. Reg. 5298 (Feb. 23, 1988) (stating that "[a] fundamental goal of the CERCLA
enforcement program is to facilitate voluntary settlements"); see also Samson, supra note
19, at 523. "Whenever possible, the EPA will attempt to reach a negotiated settlement
with PRPs, through which the PRPs will conduct or finance response actions. CERCLA
provides the EPA with a number of provisions to encourage settlements." Samson, supra
note 19, at 523.
35 Superfund Program; Notice Letters, Negotiations and Information Exchange, 53
Fed. Reg. 5300 (Feb. 23, 1988); see, e.g., Stamford Wallpaper Co., Inc. v. TIG Ins., 138
F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the background of EPA's PRP letter process);
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 49 F.3d 1128, 1130 (6th Cir. 1995)
(describing a PRP letter's general contents).
36 Superfund Program; Notice Letters, Negotiations and Information Exchange, 53
Fed. Reg. 5300.
37 See R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 870 A.2d 1048, 1056 (Conn.
2005); see also Mark S. Dennison, Annotation, What Constitutes "Suit Triggering"
Insurer's Duty to Defend Environmental Claims-State Cases, 48 A.L.R. 5th 355, 367
(1997).
38 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L.
REv. 2029, 2089 (2005). "[T]he Supreme Court's recent narrow interpretation of
CERCLA section 113(f) in [Cooper v. Aviall] demonstrates a particular lack of concern
for the role of private bargaining and private incentives in environmental law." Id.
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2000). Section 9613(f)(2) states:
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actions from other PRPs.40 Second, PRPs may receive concessions with
respect to past environmental cleanup costs. 4 1 Third, PRPs can lower
remediation costs by beginning to remediate at an earlier stage in the spread
of contamination. 42 Fourth, the EPA may allow the PRP to pursue alternative
and less costly remediation methods.43 Fifth, the PRP can exert some control
over the administrative record.44 Finally, the PRP may obtain a covenant not
to sue from the EPA.4 5 If the EPA does not reach a negotiated settlement
with the PRP, then the EPA may either issue an administrative order46 or the
EPA may choose to perform the cleanup at the site and file a cost recovery
action against the PRP.47 Thus, if the EPA and PRP do not negotiate a
Settlement. A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a
State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for
claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such
settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its
terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of
the settlement.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2).
40 1d; see R.T. Vanderbilt Co., 870 A.2d at 1056-57.
41 See R.T. Vanderbilt Co., 870 A.2d at 1056 (citing C. SWITZER & L. BULAN,
CERCLA: COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY
ACT (SuPERFUND) § 11.1.4 (2002)).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2000). Section 9606(a) states:
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when the
President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to
the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened
release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the Attorney
General of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such
danger or threat, and the district court of the United States in the district in which the
threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public interest and the
equities of the case may require. The President may also, after notice to the affected
State, take other action under this section including, but not limited to, issuing such
orders as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the
environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000).
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settlement, both the EPA and PRP will likely face litigation. 48 In order to
promote efficiency in remediating contaminated properties and to keep
litigation costs down, the EPA must continue to encourage voluntary
negotiated settlements with PRPs.
B. ADR Techniques Employed by the EPA to Help Reach Negotiated
Settlements Under CERCLA
The EPA employs a number of ADR techniques in order to assist PRPs
and the EPA in reaching a negotiated settlement under CERCLA.49 The EPA
finds that the use of ADR techniques leads to quicker and more efficient
cleanups of contaminated sites because of the increased cooperation of PRPs
in participating with the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.50 In defining
ADR, the EPA adopted the definition used by the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1996, stating that ADR is "any procedure that is used to
resolve issues in controversy, including, but not limited to, conciliation,
facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, minitrials, arbitration, and use of
ombuds, or any combination thereof."' 5 1 The EPA promotes the use of ADR
techniques in many situations involving PRPs, including adjudications,
administrative and civil judicial enforcement actions, permit issuance,
negotiations, and litigation. 52
Congress granted the EPA the ability to use both arbitration and
mediation within the settlement provisions added to CERCLA by SARA. 53
The principal ADR technique used by the EPA is mediation. 54 In mediating a
dispute under CERCLA, a neutral third party mediator promotes a "voluntary
48 In fact, after the Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall, it is likely that attorneys
will advise clients to wait for litigation in order to save the PRPs contribution rights.
Craft & Sheppard, supra note 10, at 18.
49 See Niermann, supra note 4, at 389. "Since its enactment in 1980 [CERCLA] has
served as a laboratory for various ADR methods as regulators and [PRPs] have searched
for the most effective means to assess and remediate these hazards." Id.
50 Id. at 390-91.
51 5 U.S.C. § 571(3) (2000); see also Environmental Protection Agency Policy on
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,859 (Dec. 27, 2000).
52 Environmental Protection Agency Policy on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65
Fed. Reg. 81,859.
53 Niermann, supra note 4, at 396; 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (2000). The discussion in this
Note focuses more on the mediation of disputes under CERCLA because the EPA
regulations for arbitration generally apply to cost recovery claims for less than $500,000,
which most often only allow de minimis PRPs to arbitrate a dispute.
54 Samson, supra note 19, at 527.
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negotiated settlement" between the EPA and a PRP or between two opposing
PRPs.55 The mediation of environmental disputes is often successful in
aiding negotiations that otherwise would be time consuming and costly. 56
However, if the parties do not have the incentive or are unwilling to
negotiate, then mediation and other ADR techniques will be of little use to
the parties.57
Many ADR techniques used by the EPA have proven effective in
resolving disputes under CERCLA. 58 ADR assists parties to resolve
CERCLA disputes, which greatly decreases the potentially large transaction
costs of environmental litigation. 59 The injection of a mediator, or some other
form of a neutral third party, into environmental disputes assists the parties in
overcoming any obstacles in negotiating a settlement.60 The numerous
benefits of ADR in helping parties to reach negotiated settlements make it
essential that all the incentives for ADR remain in place for parties involved
in environmental disputes.
III. CERCLA CONTRIBUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION IN COOPER V. A VIALL
Since CERCLA's enactment in 1980 a substantial amount of legal
challenges to CERCLA's provisions have been litigated, with many cases
reaching the Supreme Court.61 Unfortunately, Congress left the courts little
55 Id. at 527-28.
56 Id. at 528.
57 See id. at 528.
58 Id. at 529. There are numerous reasons for the success of ADR under CERCLA.
Id. First, the strict liability standard drastically decreases the incentive to litigate. Id.
Second, because most CERCLA disputes involve complex issues, a third party neutral
with expertise in the field can provide superior representation to a judge with relatively
little experience with CERCLA claims. See id. Additionally, the mediator, or third party
neutral, can "facilitate the sharing of information" between parties. Id. at 529-30. Finally,
the expertise of the mediator or third party neutral helps craft solutions that effectively
address the complex issues involved with CERCLA disputes. Id at 530.
59 Id. at 530.
60 Samson, supra note 19, at 530-31. Ms. Samson provides a detailed discussion of
ADR under CERCLA. See id. at 528.
61 Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the
Controversy Over CERCLA Claims Brought by Potentially Responsible Parties, 21
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 83, 83 (1997). The following is a lengthy, but non-exhaustive list
of United States Supreme Court decisions involving CERCLA. See generally Cooper
Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) (limiting PRPs ability to obtain
[Vol. 22:3 20071
COOPER V. A VIALL'S EFFECT ON ADR UNDER CERCLA
legislative history involving CERCLA's provisions, and did not make the
necessary effort to draft a clear statute. 62 Most of the questions reaching the
Supreme Court involve issues arising from the unclear and conflicting
language.63 In one of its most recent opinions involving CERCLA, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether parties who voluntarily incur
cleanup costs at contaminated sites can obtain contribution from other
PRPs.64 This Part first discusses CERCLA contribution before Cooper v.
Aviall in Section A.65 Section B examines the Supreme Court's decision in
Cooper v. Aviall,66 and Section C evaluates whether parties can obtain
contribution under § 107(a)(4)(B) after Cooper v. Aviall.67
A. CERCLA Contribution Before Cooper v. Aviall
Following CERCLA's enactment in 1980, PRPs began to litigate the
issue of whether, in addition to the government, a PRP incurring response
costs could recover those costs from other PRPs.68 In particular, the litigation
involved whether PRPs who voluntarily incurred response costs and were not
contribution from other PRPs); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (holding
that parent companies can be held responsible under CERCLA for their subsidiary's
actions); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994) (concluding that a PRP
could recover response costs put towards the identification of other PRPs); Exxon Corp.
v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986) (finding that State funds for third parties damaged by
hazardous releases are not preempted by CERCLA).
62 Hernandez, supra note 61, at 83. "[O]ne might assume Congress took great care
to craft a clear statute.... [However,] CERCLA's legislative history is sparse, and some
of is provisions are unclear and seemingly contradictory." Id.
63 Id. at 83; see also Saleel V. Sabnis, Casenote, Aviall v. Cooper Industries: The
Emerging Controversy Behind CERCLA 's Contribution Provision, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
261, 264 (2005) (stating that although Congress had good intentions when enacting
CERCLA, it drafted language that was incredibly ambiguous and subject to a great
amount of litigation).
64 The opinion written by Justice Thomas finding that parties voluntarily incurring
cleanup costs can not obtain contribution under § 113 of CERCLA is thoroughly
examined in Part Il(B) below.
65 See infra Part III.A.
66 See infra Part III.B.
67 See infra Part III.C.
68 The federal government may clean up a contaminated area itself under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604 (2000), or it may compel responsible parties to perform the cleanup under 42
U.S.C. § 9607 (2000). See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994).
The federal government can then recover the response costs from the PRP. Cooper v.
Aviall, 543 U.S. at 161.
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yet subject to suit could raise cost recovery claims against other PRPs.69 In
the past, some courts found that § 107(a)(4)(B) 70 authorized a cost recovery
action for PRPs who voluntarily incurred response costs against another
PRP. 71 Additionally, after CERCLA's enactment, litigation arose over
whether a PRP that had been sued in a cost-recovery action could
successfully obtain contribution from other PRPs.72 The original 1980
CERCLA provisions did not use the word "contribution" or expressly
authorize a defendant PRP a right of action for contribution from other
PRPs.73 However, many district courts held that a right of action for
contribution could be implied from the statutory text or from federal common
law. 74
When Congress amended CERCLA with SARA in 1986, it responded to
the confusion created from a lack of an express provision, creating a right of
action for PRPs to obtain contribution.75 Congress added § 113, which
created an express cause of action for PRPs to obtain contribution during or
69 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 161.
70 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000). Section 9607(a)(4)(B) states:
[A]ny person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for... any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan ....
42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(4)(B).
71 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 161. See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco,
Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890-92 (9th Cir. 1986); Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311,
317-18 (6th Cir. 1985); Philadelphia v. Stephan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140-43
(E.D. Pa. 1982).
72 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 162.
73 Id. The right of PRPs to obtain contribution from other PRPs was later added as a
result of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). See
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
74 See, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1263-69 (D.
Del. 1986) (stating that federal common law provides PRPs a right of action for
contribution); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486-93 (D. Colo. 1985)
(finding that common law allows right of action for contribution); Wehner v. Syntex
Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (determining that the
contribution right is implied from § 107(e)(2)).
75 Wm. Bradford Reynolds & Lisa K. Hsiao, The Right of Contribution Under
CERCLA After Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, 18 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 339, 342
(2005).
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following any civil action under § 106 or § 107(a), 76 and a right of
contribution for PRPs who have resolved their liability through an
"administratively or judicially approved settlement."'77
B. The Cooper v. Aviall Decision
In December 2004, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Thomas, delivered a crushing blow to PRPs' ability to obtain contribution
from other PRPs.78 The Court held that a PRP cannot obtain contribution
from other PRPs if it has not yet been sued under § 106 or § 107(a) of
CERCLA. 79 The case involved four contaminated sites in Texas that Aviall
Services purchased from Cooper Industries in 1981.80 Aviall discovered that
the groundwater beneath the site became contaminated by leaks from the
underground storage tank system and spills.81 Aviall further discovered that
the previous owner, Cooper, contributed to the contamination of the four
sites.82
After making the discovery, Aviall voluntarily contacted the Texas
National Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC) to notify them of the
76 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (2000). Section 9613(0(1) states:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil
action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such
claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution
claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection
shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the
absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
77 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2000). Section 9613(f)(3)(B) states: "A person who
has resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response action
or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administratively or judicially approved
settlement ... " 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B).
78 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
79 Id. at 167.
8 0 1d. at 163.
81 Id. at 163-64.
82 Id. Cooper conceded to the fact that it contributed to the contamination of the
facilities, making it a PRP for the purposes of potential liability under CERCLA. Aviall
Services, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 2001).
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contaminated sites. 83 The TNRCC responded by informing Aviall that it
violated state environmental laws, directed Aviall to perform a cleanup at the
site, and threatened an enforcement action if Aviall did not begin to
remediate the sites. 84 However, the TNRCC and the EPA chose not to pursue
judicial or administrative measures to force cleanup. 85 Aviall proceeded to
voluntarily remediate the sites under the TNRCC's supervision, incurring
approximately $5 million in cleanup costs.86
After remediating the sites, Aviall filed an action against Cooper to
recover cleanup costs in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas. 87 The initial complaint advanced a cost recovery claim
under § 107(a) and a claim for contribution under § 113(f)(1), as well as a
state law claim.88 Aviall amended the complaint and combined the two
CERCLA actions into a claim for contribution under § 113(f)(1). 89 The
United States Supreme Court held that § 113(f)(1) did not authorize the suits
because Aviall voluntarily remediated the contaminated sites.90 The first
sentence of § 113(0(1) states that "[a]ny person may seek
contribution... during or following any civil action under section 9606 of
this title or under section 9607(a) of this title."91 The Supreme Court
reasoned that the "natural" meaning of the first sentence "is that contribution
may only be sought subject to the specified conditions, namely, 'during or
following' a specified civil action." 92
Aviall argued that "may" in § 113(0(1) should be read as discretionary,
not mandatory.93 Therefore, if Aviall's interpretation were followed, then
"during or following" would be one of a variety of instances where a PRP
may seek contribution. 94 The Court rejected Aviall's argument, finding that
"may" in the enabling clause only authorized contribution actions "during or
83 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 164.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 164.
9 0 Id. at 167.
91 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1). Section 9606 is the United States Code designation for
CERCLA § 106, and § 9607(a) is the United States Code designation for CERCLA
§ 107(a).
92 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 165-66.
9 3 Id. at 166.
9 4
Id.
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following" a specified civil action.95 The Court also reasoned that Aviall's
interpretation makes much of §§ 113(0(1) and 113(f)(3)(B) superfluous, and
that Congress would not have specified the conditions for bringing
contribution claims if it intended to allow PRPs to bring contribution actions
under any circumstances.96
Aviall also argued that the last sentence of § 113(0(1) authorized its
contribution action.97 The last sentence, also known as the savings clause,
states: "Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to
bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section
9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title."98 The Court interpreted the
sentence as not to eliminate other causes of action for contribution
independent of § 113(0(1). 99 The Court held that the savings clause did not
allow contribution actions under § 113(0(1) unless the action was brought
during or following a § 106 or § 107(a) civil action.100
The Court then looked to all of § 113 to further demonstrate its
conclusion.' 0 ' The Court pointed to the other expressed method for obtaining
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (2000).
99 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 166. The Court's opinion stated that the savings
clause rebutted "any presumption that the express right of contribution provided by the
enabling clause is the exclusive cause of action for contribution available to a PRP," but
the savings clause is not itself a cause of action. Id. at 166-67. The Court stated that the
savings clause did not expand § 113(0(1) to allow PRPs to bring contribution actions
outside of a § 106 or a § 107 civil action. Id. at 167. Also, the savings clause makes no
mention of additional causes of action to obtain contribution outside of § 113(0(1). Id.
The Court concluded that "reading the savings clause to authorize [section] 113(0(1)
contribution actions" to actions brought prior to a § 106 or § 107(a) civil action "would
again violate the settled rule that we must, if possible, construe a statute to give every
word some operative effect." Id.
100 Id. at 167; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (2000).
101 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167. Section 113(0 states:
(f) Contribution.
(1) Contribution. Any person may seek contribution from any other person who
is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a)... during or following any
civil action under section 9606 ... or under section 9607(a) .... Such claims
shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution
claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this
subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for
contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 or 9607 ....
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contribution in § 113(f)(3)(B), which allows a PRP to obtain contribution
after an administrative or judicially approved settlement that resolves liability
to the United States or a state. 10 2 Section 113(g)(3) then provides a statute of
limitations for contributions under §§ 113(f)(1) and 113(f)(3)(B), but does
not provide a statute of limitations for contribution actions outside of
§§ 113(f)(1) and 113(f)(3)(B). 10 3 Therefore, the Supreme Court found that in
order to make a contribution claim under § 113(f), the PRP must fall within
the conditions of either § 113(f)(1) or § 113(f)(3)(B). 10 4
(2) Settlement. A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a
State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable
for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such
settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless
its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the
amount of the settlement.
(3) Persons not party to settlement.
(A) If the United States or a State has obtained less than complete relief
from a person who has resolved its liability to the United States or the
State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement, the United
States or the State may bring an action against any person who has not so
resolved its liability.
(B) A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State
for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such
action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek
contribution from any person who is not party to a settlement referred to in
paragraph (2).
(C) In any action under this paragraph, the rights of any person who has
resolved its liability to the United States or a State shall be subordinate to
the rights of the United States or the State. Any contribution action
brought under this paragraph shall be governed by Federal law.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000).
102 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167.
103 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). The statute of limitations for § 113(f) contribution
actions is provided in § 1 13(g)(3). Section 113(g)(3) states:
No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be commenced
more than 3 years after-
(A) the date of judgment in any action under this chapter for recovery of such
costs or damages, or
(B) the date of an administrative order under section 9622(g) of this title
(relating to de minimis settlements) or 9622(h) of this title (relating to cost
recovery settlements) or entry of a judicially approved settlement with respect
to such costs or damages.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) (2000).
104 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
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C. Section 107(a)(4)(B) Cost Recovery Actions
Aviall finally argued, and the dissenting Justices agreed, that even if it
could not seek contribution under § 113(f)(1), it may seek a cost recovery
action under § 107(a)(4)(B). 10 5 The majority refused to address the issue
because it had not been properly briefed. 106 However, it appears that there is
no support for an implied cause of action under § 107(a) either in the
language of § 107(a), or in Congress's deliberation over the addition of
§ 113(f).10 7 In fact, many circuits have rejected PRPs' attempts at obtaining
cost recovery solely under § 107(a)(4)(B). 10 8 It is likely, if the issue of
contribution through § 107(a) appears before the Supreme Court, that the
Court will find that PRPs may only obtain contribution through § 113(f).109
First, it can be easily argued that the enactment of § 113(f)
"superseded... any implied right of contribution.., under section 107(a) of
105 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 168; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000). Section
9607(a)(4)(B) states:
[A]ny person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for . .. any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan;
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(B).
106 See Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 168.
107 Reynolds & Hsiao, supra note 75, at 345.
108 Id. at 345 n.37; see Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423-24 (2d Cir.
1998) (stating that "[t]he district court in the present case properly held that [the PRP]
could not pursue a 107(a) cost recovery claim against [other PRPs] due to its status as a
potentially responsible person.... CERCLA 113(f) plainly governs such contribution
actions."); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d
769, 776 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that because the case before the court involved only
PRPs, the PRP must seek contribution under § 113); see also Reynolds & Hsiao, supra
note 75, at 345 n.37 (providing citations to cases in the first, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth,
tenth, and eleventh circuits where PRPs could not pursue 107(a) cost recovery claims).
109 Reynolds & Hsiao, supra note 75, at 345. Neither § 107(a), nor the addition of
§ 113(f) under SARA creating an "explicit right of contribution under CERCLA,"
supports an implied contribution action under § 107(a). Id. "Moreover, with the
enactment of SARA, past efforts by PRPs to invoke section 107(a)(4)(B)'s cost recovery
provisions in this manner have been uniformly rejected by every federal appeals court to
have entertained the question." Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
CERCLA." l 0 Second, there is a strong argument that the "any other
persons" language of § 107(a) refers only to the government, innocent parties
or landowners, or "Good Samaritans,"' I  because they cannot maintain a
contribution action under § 113(f).112 Also, the statute of limitations under
§ 113 for contribution actions is three years, but § 107(a) does not have a
statute of limitations for contribution suits. 113 Allowing PRPs to obtain
contribution through a § 107(a) action does not appear to be feasible without
the court acting as a legislature and rewriting the statute.114 Therefore, it
appears that if the Supreme Court addresses the issue of PRPs obtaining
contribution under § 107(a), it will likely find that PRPs' only method of
obtaining contribution is through § 113(f). 115
After Cooper v. Aviall, there has been a split amongst the circuits over
the issue of whether a PRP can recover costs under § 107(a). 116 Some courts
find that the party asserting the cost recovery claim must be an innocent party
in order to recover costs under § 107(a). 117 However other courts, realizing
110 Id. at 345-46. The contribution provisions enacted as part of SARA has been
interpreted by many to codify the implied right of contribution. Id. at 346 n.39.
III Id. at 350.
112 Id. at 346-47.
There is the language of section 107(a), which identifies the four categories of
"covered persons" who may be held jointly and severally liable for the costs of
cleaning up hazardous waste sites. These "covered persons" include essentially
private PRPs who own or owned contaminated property, who transported or assisted
in the transport of hazardous substances, and/or who contributed ... to a
contaminated condition. On its face section 107(a) reserves private rights of action
to "any other person" seeking to recover from these "covered" PRPs whatever
necessary response costs that "other person" may have legitimately incurred. While
not entirely free from doubt ... the "other persons" identified in subparagraph B
refer to private parties other than those individuals described in section 107(a)(1)-
(4) as "covered" PRPs.
Id. (emphasis added).
113 Id. at 349.
114 See id. at 349 n.55.
115 See Reynolds & Hsiao, supra note 75, at 349-50.
116 See infra notes 117-18.
117 See E.I. Dupont Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F. 3d 515, 529 (2006);
Kaladish v. Uniroyal Holding, Inc., No. 300-854, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17272, at *9
(D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2005); CadleRock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Schilberg, No.
301-896, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14701, at *27 (D. Conn. July 18, 2005); Benderson
Dev. Co., Inc. v. Neumade Products Corp., No. 98-0241, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14943,
at *30-32 (W.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005); Montville Twp. v. Woodmont Builders, LLC, No.
03-2680, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18079, at *18-19 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2005).
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that depriving a PRP of a remedy creates an incentive for parties to wait to be
sued before incurring response costs, and potentially causing even greater
environmental damage, hold that a PRP can recover response costs under
§ 107(a). 118 When this issue reaches the Supreme Court, the Court,
unfortunately, will likely follow the former interpretation rather than the
latter. 119
If the § 107(a) issue were to reach the Supreme Court, and the Court
ruled that PRPs could obtain contribution through § 107(a), then its decision
in Cooper v. Aviall would become virtually irrelevant. 120 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has chosen to render the Supreme
Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall irrelevant by allowing a PRP to obtain
contribution through § 107(a). 12 1 In Con Ed v. UGI, Con Ed sought to obtain
contribution for cleanup costs from UGI. 122 After filing suit, Con Ed
negotiated a "voluntary cleanup agreement" with the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation. 123 The Second Circuit chose to
support a policy of encouraging voluntary cleanups, unlike the Supreme
118 Metro Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing &
Coatings, Inc., No. 05-3299, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 913, at *31-32 (7th Cir. Jan. 17
2007); At. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,
75 U.S.L.W. 3384 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2007) (No. 06-562); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v.
UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2005); Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 95,
106 n.8 (2d Cir. 2005); Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1078-79
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Adobe's § 107(a) claim for
contribution. The judge denied defendant's motion, stating that he had "difficulty
imagining that the Ninth Circuit would prevent PRPs from pursuing contribution claims
for clean up costs incurred voluntarily."); Vine St., LLC v. Keeling, 362 F. Supp. 2d 754,
763 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
119 See generally Reynolds & Hsiao, supra note 75, at 345-51 (discussing the
impact of the Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall).
120 Aaron Gershonowitz, 'Con Ed v. UGI': Is the Supreme Court's 'Aviall' Now
Irrelevant?, in 234 N.Y.L.J. 116 (Dec. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.fcsmcc.com/news/pdfs/nylj_121605.pdf.
121 Con Edv. UGI, 423 F.3d at 100.
For these reasons, we hold that section 107(a) permits a party that has not been
sued or made to participate in an administrative proceeding, but that, if sued, would
be held liable under section 107(a), to recover necessary response costs incurred
voluntarily, not under a court or administrative order or judgment.
Id. This case involved an agreement where Con Ed voluntarily agreed to begin cleanups
at a number of manufactured gas plants that it or its predecessors may have formerly
owned or operated. Id. at 93.
12 2 Id. at 92; Gershonowitz, supra note 120.
123 Con Edv. UGI, 423 F.3d at 93; Gershonowitz, supra note 120.
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Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall which discourages voluntary
cleanups. 124 Although the Second Circuit's finding would be considered
correct by many commentators based on the policy it promotes, the decision,
if followed by other courts, would render the decision in Cooper v. Aviall
irrelevant.125 Rendering statutory precedent moot, without a Congressional
response, is not a course that the Supreme Court is likely to take. 126
Therefore it appears that an attempt by a PRP to obtain contribution under
§ 107(a)(4)(B) will likely fail if the issue reaches the Supreme Court, and
PRPs may only obtain contribution if sued under § 106127 or § 107(a)128 of
CERCLA, or if the PRP has completely resolved its liability through either
an administratively or judicially approved settlement.
IV. EFFECTS OF COOPER V. A VIALL ON NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS
The Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall may cause PRPs to
wait for the EPA to file a civil suit against the PRP before incurring response
costs. 129 The outcome in Cooper v. Aviall erases the advantages that PRPs
gain from voluntarily incurring response costs or remediating contaminated
sites and beginning negotiations with the EPA or state administrative
agencies. 130 "The result is that far fewer [CERCLA] cleanup actions will
occur and that the public fisc will bear the enforcement costs of those that
124 Gershonowitz, supra note 120 (discussing that "[t]he Second Circuit also
examined the relevant policy implications and, less than a year after the Supreme Court
in Aviall appeared to discourage voluntary cleanups, issued a decision clearly aimed at
encouraging voluntary cleanups").
125 See id.
126 See Amy C. Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Court of Appeals, 73 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 317, 348-49 (2005) (stating that if Congress does not agree with the
Court's interpretation, then it is Congress's job to fix the problem). In her article,
Professor Barrett cited numerous Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases in support
of her statement. See id. at 348 n. 164; see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74
(1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that interpretations of federal statutes should
remain undisturbed until Congress chooses to say otherwise); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) (stating that courts should be weary of overruling
statutory precedent because Congress has the opportunity to overrule the prior decision);
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (explaining that "considerations of
stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to
change this Court's interpretation of its legislation").
127 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2000).
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
129 See, e.g., Millan, supra note 2, at 214.
130 See Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2089-90.
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do."' 3 1 This Part discusses the impact of the Court's decision on PRPs'
abilities and willingness to attempt to reach a negotiated settlement with the
EPA. Section A briefly discusses how the Supreme Court's decision in
Cooper v. Aviall undermines the EPA's policy on the use of ADR to resolve
environmental conflicts. 132 Section B examines the loss of bargaining power
that PRPs may have suffered since the Court's decision in Cooper v.
Aviall.133 Section C discusses the impact of the Court's decision on
transaction costs and the efficiency of environmental cleanups.134
A. The Undermining of an Agency Policy
The Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall strikes a strong blow
against those who promote the use of ADR in the environmental field. The
EPA policy on ADR points to the numerous benefits of ADR. 135 First, ADR
leads to the faster resolution of issues. 136 Second, ADR allows the parties to
achieve more creative, satisfying, and enduring solutions. 137 Third, the use of
ADR reduces transaction costs for both the EPA and the PRP. 138 Fourth,
ADR promotes "a culture of respect and trust among the EPA, its
stakeholders, and its employees," leading to "improved working
relationships."' 139 Finally, the use of ADR "increases the likelihood of
compliance with environmental laws and regulation," creates "broader
stakeholder support for agency programs," and produces "better
environmental outcomes."'140 In destroying the incentive for voluntary
cleanups, the Court undermines each of these benefits of ADR.
131 Id. at 2090.
132 See infra Part IV.A.
133 See infra Part 1V.B.
134 See infra Part IV.C.
135 See Environmental Protection Agency Policy on Alternative Dispute Resolution,
65 Fed. Reg. 81,858-59 (Dec. 27, 2000) (stating that ADR creates a more efficient
working place and increases cooperation with state and local governments, PRPs, public
interest groups, and the public).
136 Id. at 81,858.
137 Id
138 Id.
139 Id. at 81,859.
140 Id.
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First, the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall does nothing to
promote the faster resolution of issues. 141 A PRP's best option now is to wait
for litigation because the Court has destroyed the PRP's incentive to
voluntarily incur cleanup costs. PRPs are now more apt to go through the
long and protracted litigation process in order to be able to obtain
contribution rights from other PRPs. 142 Second, litigation will likely not
result in "[m]ore creative, satisfying and enduring solutions."'1 43 Litigation
generally does not allow for third parties such as community groups and
public interest groups to become involved in finding an amicable resolution
to issues that benefit all participating parties.' 44 Third, increasing the amount
of litigation in CERCLA contribution actions will cause a dramatic increase
in transaction costs. 145 Finally, the Court's decision could possibly decrease
the "likelihood of compliance with environmental laws and regulation[s],"
lessening "stakeholder support for agency programs."'1 46
B. Decreased Bargaining Power for PRPs
An important advantage for PRPs who voluntarily incur cleanup costs is
the increased bargaining power gained in negotiations. 147 Environmental
negotiations are more likely to be successful if the balance of power between
141 Compare MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra
note 5 (stating the CEQ's policy goals for resolving environmental conflicts).
142 Id.
143 See Environmental Protection Agency Policy on Alternative Dispute Resolution,
65 Fed. Reg. 81,858 (Dec. 27, 2000).
144 See Niermann, supra note 4, at 404-06 (stating that Congress wished to gain
widespread public support for the remediation of contaminated hazardous waste sites
under CERCLA).
145 See infra Part IV.C.
146 See Environmental Protection Agency Policy on Alternative Dispute Resolution,
65 Fed. Reg. at 81,859; see also Diane R. Smith & Summer L. Nastich, Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 47 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 18, 20-21 (2005)
(stating that "because Cooper encourages recalcitrance on the part of PRPs, agencies will
be under significant pressure to use their enforcement authority to bring otherwise
unwilling parties to the table").
147 See generally Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets
Goliath: Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 5
(2000) (discussing how parties in negotiations attempt to gain greater bargaining power
to improve their position in negotiations).
860
[Vol. 22:3 2007]
COOPER V. A VIALL'S EFFECT ON ADR UNDER CERCLA
the parties can be brought closer to equilibrium. 148 Because of CERCLA's
strict liability regime, the scale already tips heavily towards the EPA in
relation to relative bargaining power between the parties. 149 Thus, PRPs will
receive no benefits from negotiation and other ADR techniques employed
between the PRP and the EPA if the PRP's already limited bargaining power
is diminished.150
But the Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall may cause PRPs to choose
litigation over negotiated settlements. 151 The Court's decision leaves little
incentive to enter into voluntary cleanups and negotiations. 152 If a PRP, after
receiving notice from the EPA, begins to voluntarily incur cleanup costs and
also begins negotiations with the EPA or a state administrative agency, it
may be precluded from recovering those cleanup costs if the PRP cannot
obtain an administrative or judicially approved settlement.153
Thus, a PRP wishing to perform a voluntary cleanup of a property is at
the mercy of the administrative agency to reach an administrative or
judicially approved settlement because the PRP is left with little or no
bargaining power in negotiations. This proposition can be analogized to the
plight of consumers and potential employees who have little bargaining
power in negotiating arbitration agreements. 154 A PRP may be forced to
sacrifice any potential bargaining power in order to reach a speedy settlement
148 See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
139, 177 (2005) (stating that studies of environmental disputes have shown that increased
bargaining power has produced increased success in negotiations) (citation omitted).
149 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER &
JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 272 (4th ed.
2003) [hereinafter PERCIVAL].
150 See Wood, supra note 4, at 429 n.351 (stating that "[c]ommentators emphasize
that ADR can only be fair if the parties have equality in bargaining position"); see
generally DOUGLAS J. AMY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 80-82 (1987)
(finding that "without a relative balance of power between the disputing parties, sincere
negotiations [will be] unlikely to take place").
151 See Millan, supra note 2, at 214.
152 See Callie Campbell, Note, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.: A
Superfast End to Voluntary Cleanups and Efficient Environmental Management, 13 S.C.
ENVTL. L.J. 203, 205-06 (2005) ("[PRPs] have little financial incentive to conduct
voluntary cleanups anymore, leaving more of the burden of investigating sites, funding
cleanups, and bringing causes of action in the hands of the already busy EPA.").
153 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 166-67.
154 See, e.g., Sarah R. Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1, 48
n.220 (2005).
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so that it may obtain contribution from other PRPs. 155 Much like the
initiation of a general employee-employer relationship, a PRP who
voluntarily begins cleanup is now forced to negotiate on the EPA's terms.
The PRP is given no benefit of its efforts to be a responsible corporate
citizen. It could be argued that this kind of power imbalance between the
parties remains consistent with the imbalance that exists in consumer-seller
and employee-employer relationships, and should thus be written off as
collateral damage. After all, an employee often times must sacrifice some of
her potential advantages in order to obtain employment; likewise, a voluntary
PRP may sacrifice many of its advantages in negotiations to obtain
contribution. But a fundamental difference exists between the employee and
the PRP. The employee seeks to improve her own situation, whereas the
voluntary PRP seeks to improve the public health and welfare of society by
beginning a voluntary cleanup. Not only does the voluntary PRP protect its
own interests, but in the voluntary cleanup scenario, it seeks to protect the
interests of society as a whole. Based on policy reasons, including the need to
protect the environment, the voluntary PRP is entitled to more bargaining
power when negotiating a settlement with the EPA. On the other hand, after
Cooper v. Aviall, if the PRP simply waits for the EPA or a state
administrative agency to bring a civil suit against the PRP, then it may seek
contribution for cleanup costs under § 113 at any point after the EPA brings
the civil suit. 156
It appears that when Congress drafted § 113, it did not consider PRPs
incurring voluntary cleanup costs. 157 The outcome of Cooper v. Aviall, which
appears to be a correct statutory interpretation, creates an absurdity that must
not go ignored. PRPs who voluntarily incur cleanup costs cannot receive
contribution until they are sued or reach an administrative or judicially
approved settlement, 158 which generally occurs after substantial cleanup
costs have been incurred. But PRPs who wait-possibly in bad faith-to
have a civil suit brought against them may obtain contribution immediately
upon the suit being brought. 159 There exists no rationale to explain why PRPs
155 See Sarah R. Cole, Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 GA. L. REv. 1145,
1158 (2004) (discussing in the employment context that "[s]treamlined procedures and
speed may disproportionately impact the party who had less bargaining power when the
initial agreement was negotiated").
156 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); see also Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167.
157 See Reynolds & Hsiao, supra note 75, at 353-55.
158 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 166-67.
159 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1); see also Smith & Nastich, supra note 146, at 20-21.
The authors further explained that "[r]ecalcitrant PRPs will benefit from the Cooper
decision, since it in effect shields PRPs from liability for their share of response costs if
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who voluntarily incur response costs are punished and PRPs who wait for
litigation in hopes of avoiding response costs are rewarded. 160
C. Increased Transaction Costs and Decreased Efficiency
Because of the potential for increased litigation as a result of the decision
in Cooper v. Aviall, transaction costs for the cleanup of contaminated sites
will likely rise for PRPs, the EPA, and state administrative agencies. 161
Having a "litigation-driven system funnels too much CERCLA money into
transaction costs and too little into site cleanup."'162 The costs incurred as a
result of litigation can often exceed the costs of a PRP voluntarily incurring
response costs and entering into negotiations with the EPA or a state
administrative agency.163 Litigation under CERCLA typically generates high
transaction costs. 164 Often times, the transaction costs are greater than the
costs incurred to investigate the contamination and remediate the site.165 For
example, the Rand Institute conducted a study of transaction costs versus
investigation and remediation costs of seventy-three CERCLA sites in
1992.166 Of the seventy-three sites studied, twenty had transaction costs
"equal to or greater than the expenditures for site assessment and
another PRP voluntarily cleans up a site prior to an enforcement action." Smith &
Nastich, supra note 146, at 20. Additionally, because Cooper v. Aviall will cause PRPs to
become non-cooperative with the government, agencies will be forced to more frequently
use their enforcement powers to ensure that PRPs take part in the cleanup of
contaminated sites. Id. at 21.
160 PRPs who voluntarily remediate their contaminated property deserve to be
rewarded for their willingness to help protect the public health and welfare and defray the
costs that would be compounded by inaction. See Sabnis, supra note 63, at 261 (stating
that because of the potentially high cleanup costs of contaminated sites, "property owners
who exhibit the voluntary initiative to clean their own land before hazardous waste
accumulates deserve praise").
161 Niermann, supra note 4, at 413.
162 See PERCIVAL, supra note 149, at 284.
163 In a recent memorandum, the OMB and CEQ listed the challenges faced by the
federal government when approaching environmental conflicts. See infra Part V.B.
164 Niermann, supra note 4, at 413.
165 Id.. This is not to say that investigation and remediation costs at a contaminated
site are inexpensive relative to the transaction costs. In 1994, it was determined that the
"average cost of CERCLA remediation" was approximately $25,000,000 per site. Payson
R. Peabody, Comment, Taming CERCLA: A Proposal to Resolve the Trustee "Owner"
Liability Quandary, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 405,421 (1994) (citation omitted).
166 Niermann, supra note 4, at 413 n. 165.
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remediation."1 67 When analyzing all of the sites, twenty-one percent of the
costs incurred were transactional. 168 These transactional costs due to
litigation are paralyzing to both the EPA and PRPs.169 In order to limit
transaction costs, the use of negotiated settlements and ADR to resolve
CERCLA disputes must continue to be a goal that the EPA can achieve and
that the courts should respect.170
Additionally, the increase in litigation will cause a decrease in efficiency
in the parties' ability to resolve the conflict and in the assessment and
remediation of the site. 171 The adversary system promotes a system where
PRPs defer, deny, and delay responsibility for the cleanup of a contaminated
site. 172 As the parties proceed to litigate responsibility for the cleanup, the
contamination may spread, which could further increase the cleanup costs
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See Niermann, supra note 4, at 413 (stating that "CERCLA litigation frequently
generates disproportionate transaction costs, and in an alarming number of cases the
transaction costs equal or exceed the expenditures for site study and remediation"). In
addition to the increased costs incurred by PRPs as a result of increased litigation, the
Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall will stretch the EPA's already limited resources even
thinner. See Sophia Strong, Note, Aviall Services v. Cooper Industries: Implications for
the United States' Liability under CERCLA, The "Superfund Law", 56 HASTINGS L.J.
193, 200 (2004). The EPA's limited resources "severely constrain the EPA's ability to
monitor the numerous hazardous sites throughout the country and initiate clean-up
operations on a nation-wide basis." Id, (citation omitted). Because the EPA's resources
are so limited, a collaborative approach is necessary to achieve its goal of protecting the
public health and welfare. See Molly J. Walker Wilson, A Behavioral Critique of
Command-and-Control Environmental Regulation, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 223,
239 (2005).
170 See Samson, supra note 19, at 530. "If ADR is used at Superfund sites, parties
can reach more rapid conclusions to disputes and spend less money on transaction
costs .... Id.
171 See Campbell, supra note 152, at 205-06. "The Supreme Court's ruling is likely
to have a monumental impact on businesses' approach to land contamination, CERCLA's
efficacy in managing what should become an even greater responsibility for the EPA, and
CERCLA provisions' efficiency in implementing these responsibilities." Id. at 205.
172 See Niermann, supra note 4, at 414 (finding that "[t]he delay is due to the
difficulty of navigating strict procedural formalities and an adversarial environment");
Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5 (1993) (stating
that PRPs slow down the cleanup process by constantly questioning every decision the
agency makes, causing the EPA to develop a comprehensive administrative record in
order to provide support for every decision involving the contaminated site).
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and further endanger the public health and welfare.' 73 The spread of
contamination may occur at a slow rate, depending on the media that is
impacted, and the danger to the public health may not immediately increase
because of short delay.174 However, litigation tends to proceed at a slow rate
as well. 175 For example, the litigation in Cooper v. Aviall took seven years to
reach the Supreme Court, and litigation on different issues is proceeding
through the court system as of the time of this Note's publication. 176 The
delayed response to environmentally impacted locations caused by litigation
does little to promote efficiency in cleaning up contaminated sites. 177
173 See generally Lawrence Ng, Note, A Drastic Approach to Controlling
Groundwater Pollution, 98 YALE L.J. 773 (1989) (discussing the problems of
groundwater pollution and current federal laws which address groundwater pollution).
174 For an overview and explanation of groundwater transport, see generally Gabriel
Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground
Water Resources and International Law, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 201, 207-22 (2003).
175 Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Implementation of Court-Annexed Environmental
Mediation: The District of Oregon Pilot Project, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 559, 562
(2002) (discussing how "[i]n the litigation process, environmental cases are resource-
intensive and slow moving in part because they tend to involve scientific uncertainties")
(citation omitted); see also Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass:
Real Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and its
Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 573, 602-03 (2004). "[M]ediation offers attractive
time and cost savings" as compared to the slow moving and expensive process of
litigation. Id. (citation omitted).
176 See 19-3 MEALEY'S POLLUTION LIABILITY REPORT 5 (2005). Aviall Services,
Inc. is now pursuing a § 107(a) cost recovery action against Cooper Industries, Inc. Id.
Cooper has filed for summary judgment arguing that § 107(a) only applies to "non-
responsible" or "innocent" parties. Id. Aviall argues that there is "[n]othing in the plain
language of [§] 107(a)(4)(B) [indicating] that 'any other person' is limited to innocent
parties." Id. Additionally, Aviall is trying to have its state law claims reinstated. Id. On
August 8, 2006 the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held
that Aviall could not recover under § 107(a). Aviall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc.,
No. 397-1926, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55040 (N.D. Tex Aug. 8, 2006). The district
court's ruling is now on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. See 20-5 MEALEY'S POLLUTION LIABILITY REPORT 4 (2007).
177 See PERCIVAL, supra note 149, at 284 (stating that the cleanup process of
environmentally impacted sites is usually slow and very ineffective). Obviously, these
concerns do not necessarily apply to the situation presented by Cooper v. Aviall, seeing
that a substantial portion of the cleanup has already been accomplished. But the
circumstances will apply to future cases since the incentive to voluntarily cleanup
environmentally impacted sites and negotiate with the EPA or state administrative
agencies no longer exists.
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Litigation only serves to increase transaction costs and to slow down the
process of remediating contaminated sites. 178
V. POTENTIAL FOR CONGRESS AND STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
TO CLEAN UP THE MESS OF COOPER V. A VIALL
The outcome in Cooper v. Aviall once again brings to light a question
asked by Justice Harry Blackmun in Sierra Club v. Morton:179 must the law
"be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible that we render
ourselves helpless when the existing methods and the traditional concepts do
not... prove to be entirely adequate for new issues?"'180 The Court in
Cooper v. Aviall decided to follow the path of rigid interpretation of an
environmental statute, even though the result of the interpretation is to the
detriment of the EPA, PRPs, and all of society in general. This Part discusses
a potential solution to the problems created by the Supreme Court's
decision. 181 Section A discusses potentially amending § 113(f) of CERCLA
to allow for PRPs who incur voluntary cleanup costs and begin negotiations
with the EPA or a state administrative agency to obtain contribution from
other PRPs.' 82 Section B advocates for the increased use of ADR under
CERCLA and the environmental field in general.' 83
178 This is not to say that all PRPs will cease to perform voluntary cleanups. Smith
& Nastich, supra note 146, at 20. For example, "some PRPs will perform voluntary
cleanups to prepare property for sale, maintain value, prevent contaminant migration, and
avoid liability to third parties such as adjacent property owners." Id.
179 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 755-56 (1972). In a challenge of a
proposed ski resort in the Mineral King Valley of the Sierra Nevada Mountains, the Court
held that "a mere 'interest in [an environmental] problem' . . . is not sufficient by itself to
render the organization 'adversely affected .. .- Id. at 739. The Court found that the
Sierra Club had to show that specific members were adversely affected by the proposed
ski resort. Id. at 740.
180 Id. at 755-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181 Another possible solution for PRPs, the EPA, and state agencies to circumvent
the Court's decision will not be discussed in this Note. The potential solution that will not
.be discussed involves the PRP contacting the appropriate agency and requesting that the
agency issue an administrative order or file a civil suit against the PRP immediately in
order for the PRP to file contribution actions against other PRPs. The mere potential
situation of a PRP having to call the EPA or a state agency and asking the agency to sue
it demonstrates that this is not a viable long term solution to the problem created by the
Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall.
182 See infra Part V.A.
183 See infra Part V.B.
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A. Potential Congressional Amendment of§ 113(t) of CERCLA
Congress needs to formally amend § 113(f) in order to restore the
incentive for PRPs to voluntarily incur cleanup costs while negotiating a final
settlement. 184 Otherwise, the state of environmental law may revert back to
the times before CERCLA's enactment.185 Congress should evaluate the
impact of the decision in Cooper v. Aviall and determine whether CERCLA
§ 113(f) should be amended to allow PRPs voluntarily incurring cleanup
costs to obtain contribution from other PRPs. It appears that § 107(a) of
CERCLA does not allow PRPs to recover response costs. 186
Unfortunately, the 109th Congress did not consider the environment to
be a particularly important issue. 187 However, the 110th Congress should be
concerned about the impact of Cooper v. Aviall on PRPs. In recent years
Congress has significantly changed its regulation of corporate responsibility
in America. 188 However, many PRPs have been practicing corporate
responsibility since the enactment of CERCLA by voluntarily entering into
negotiations with the EPA and state administrative agencies, as well as
184 A few members of the Senate failed in an attempt to slip an eleventh hour
amendment to § 113(f) as part of a highway bill. Failed Senate Aviall Amendment
Suggests Long Haul for Industry Fix, ENVTL. POL'Y. ALERT, Mar. 1, 2006, at 1. In light
of the recent Abramoff lobbying scandal, and the fact that the general public may now be
aware of the potentially corrupt nature of eleventh hour amendments, it is unlikely that
Congress will allow the amendment to slide by attached to another bill. Id.
185 For example, PRPs choosing to wait for the EPA to bring a civil suit against
them may allow contaminated sites to go without further investigation or remediation.
See Smith & Nastich, supra note 146, at 20-21. Even worse, PRPs may decide to avoid
investigating potential contamination altogether, in order to avoid the hassles of
enforcement. Id. Fortunately, most PRPs today are responsible and do not wish to repeat
the mistakes of the past, but Cooper v. Aviall has not done today's PRP any favors. See
generally Valerie A. Zondorak, A New Face in Corporate Environmental Responsibility:
The Valdez Principles, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 457, 469 (1991) (discussing the
corporate response to increased environmental liability).
186 Reynolds & Hsiao, supra note 75, at 345.
187 See Ira M. Gottlieb, The March Hare, Mad Hatter and Alice Return to
Superfund: The Implications of Cooper Industries Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 36
TRENDS 4, 13-14 (Mar.-Apr. 2005) (stating that "given current Congressional
priorities, such as tort reform and judicial nominations, such a legislative fix may be a
long time in the making, if it occurs at all").
188 See Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (acting in response to corporate
disasters, such as Enron and WorldCom, Congress enacted the act to increase corporate
responsibility).
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incurring response and cleanup costs. 189 The Court's decision in Cooper v.
Aviall destroys the incentive for PRPs to voluntarily admit fault and clean up
contaminated sites. 190 The PRP can only obtain contribution if subjected to a
civil suit under § 106 or § 107(a) of CERCLA or if the PRP has completely
resolved its liability through an administratively or judicially approved
settlement. 191 A PRP must then evaluate whether it is worth the risk to enter
into negotiations if an administratively or judicially approved settlement
completely resolving its liability is not attainable. 192 Therefore, Congress
must amend CERCLA to allow PRPs who voluntarily enter into negotiations
with the EPA or state administrative agencies to obtain contribution from
other PRPs.
Amending § 113(f) to allow PRPs who voluntarily incur response and
cleanup costs provides a simple solution to the problems created by Cooper
v. Aviall.193 A proposed text of a possible amendment is as follows:
(4) Voluntary Cleanup and Negotiations. A potentially responsible
party (PRP) who has voluntarily incurred cleanup costs, and entered into
negotiations with the United States or a State in order to resolve liability
with the United States or a State, may seek contribution from any other
potentially responsible party (PRP) who is not also a party to negotiations
involving the contaminated site.
By allowing PRPs to immediately obtain contribution upon voluntarily
incurring cleanup costs and entering into negotiations with the United States
or a State, PRPs are once again given bargaining power and a choice when
considering how to pursue handling an environmental conflict. PRPs
voluntarily incurring cleanup costs could then obtain contribution "during or
following" the initiation of negotiations with the EPA or a state
administrative agency, much like those PRPs that choose litigation may
obtain contribution "during or following" a civil suit. Amending CERCLA
189 See, e.g., Zondorak, supra note 185, at 469 (finding that increased liability under
CERCLA led to "corporations' increased use of environmental audits and risk
assessments to help manage environmental liabilities").
190 See Campbell, supra note 152, at 222. "One result of the Court's decision is the
near elimination of any incentive for businesses to clean up their property voluntarily.
Likewise, businesses will learn from Aviall's experience not to report suspected or
discovered contamination to state or federal agencies." Id. (citations omitted).
191 Cooper v. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167.
192 See Smith & Nastich, supra note 146, at 21. Until CERCLA is amended, PRPs
should use the Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall when developing site strategies. Id.
193 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2000).
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§ 113(f) to allow PRPs who voluntarily incur cleanup costs to obtain
contribution provides an effective remedy to the problems created by Cooper
v. Aviall.
B. The Need for ADR Under CERCLA
In determining whether to amend CERCLA, Congress should take into
account a recent joint memorandum from the CEQ and the OMB. 194 The
memorandum establishes the Executive Branch's view on the need for ADR
in resolving environmental conflicts. 195 The memorandum points out many
of the challenges that the government faces without the ability to effectively
use ADR in resolving issues. 196 These challenges include, but are not limited
to: "Protracted and costly environmental litigation;" "Unnecessarily lengthy
project and resource planning processes;" ''Costly delays in implementing
needed environmental protection measures;" "Forgone public and private
investments when decisions are not timely or are appealed;" "Lower quality
outcomes and lost opportunities when environmental plans and decisions are
not informed by all available information and perspectives;" and "Deep-
seated antagonism and hostility repeatedly reinforced between stakeholders
by unattended conflicts."' 197 As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
Cooper v. Aviall, many of these challenges will remain at the forefront of
resolving environmental conflicts. Therefore, Congress needs to amend
CERCLA in order to resolve the difference in the view of the Executive
Branch versus the Court's method of interpreting the contribution provisions
under CERCLA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of ADR and negotiated settlements by the EPA is essential for
resolving conflicts involving the CERCLA. 198 However, the Supreme
Court's decision in Cooper v. Aviall, in addition to discouraging voluntary
194 See MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 5.
"The President strongly supports constructive and timely approaches to resolving
conflicts when they arise over the use, conservation, and restoration of the environment,
natural resources, and public lands." Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 See Niermann, supra note 4, at 389.
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cleanups, 199 undermines the EPA policy of promoting the use of ADR and
reaching negotiated settlements between PRPs and the EPA or other PRPs.
The outcome encourages PRPs to wait for litigation instead of voluntarily
incurring cleanup costs or negotiating settlements with administrative
agencies. 200 In order to remedy the problems arising from the decision in
Cooper v. Aviall, Congress should amend CERCLA § 113(f) to include a
contribution right for PRPs that voluntarily incur cleanup and response costs
while negotiating with the EPA or a state administrative agency.
199 See Gershonowitz, supra note 120.
200 See Millan, supra note 2, at 214.
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